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Intelligent interfaces have moved into the mainstream, but often using black-box algorithms that 
even the developers, let alone the users can understand.  Human-like computing is about making 
algorithms closer to the way humans' think in order to improve the algorithms and/or improve the 
experience for the user.  This paper discusses issues raised during a recent EPSRC workshop in 
the UK and explores the implications for HCI and smart environments. 
Human-like computing, intelligent interfaces, low-intention interaction, HCI 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We are surrounded by increasing numbers of smart 
appliances and objects and on the net our lives are 
shaped by 'intelligent' algorithms that determine 
what books are suggested to us, what adverts are 
forced on us, and even which of our friends' gossip 
we see. 
Certainly we often feel that they should understand 
us as humans a little more, but do we want these 
algorithms to behave more like humans?  Is it 
better that AI remains as alien intelligence, or do 
we want to pursue the strong AI agenda and aim 
for artificial human-intelligence? 
A recent EPSRC workshop explored the theme of 
Human-Like Computing (EPSRC, 2016).  Given 
successes in AI, such as the Watson in Jeopardy 
(Ferrucci, 2010, 2012) and deep learning in Go 
(Silver, et al., 2016), it is not surprising that this is 
an area that is already attracting attention in the US 
and may well be a future funding priority in the UK. 
This paper, based on a earlier online post (Dix, 
2016), is a personal report on the workshop and 
how it relates to my own work in the area, to HCI 
research, and to smart environments in particular. 
WHAT IS HUMAN–LIKE COMPUTING? 
The delegate pack to the Human-Like Computing 
workshop offered a tentative definition: 
 “offering the prospect of computation which is 
akin to that of humans, where learning and 
making sense of information about the world 
around us can match our human performance.” 
(EPSRC, 2016) 
However, the purpose of this workshop was to 
clarify, and expand on this, exploring what it might 
mean for computers to become more like humans. 
It was an interdisciplinary meeting with some 
participants coming from more technical disciplines 
such as cognitive science, artificial intelligence, 
machine learning and Robotics; others from 
psychology or studying human and animal 
behaviour; and some, like myself, from HCI or 
human factors, bridging the two. 
Why? 
Perhaps the first question is why one might even 
want more human-like computing. 
There are two obvious reasons: 
(i) Because it is a good model to emulate — 
Humans are able to solve some problems, 
such as visual pattern finding, which 
computers find hard. If we can understand 
human perception and cognition, then we 
may be able to design more effective 
algorithms. For example, in my own work 
colleagues and I have used models based 
on spreading activation and layers of 
human memory when addressing ‘web 
scale reasoning’ (Katifori, et al., 2010; Dix, 
et al., 2010). 
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(ii) For interacting with people — There is 
considerable work in HCI in making 
computers easier to use, but there are 
limitations. Often we are happy for 
computers to be simply ‘tools’, but at other 
times, such as when your computer notifies 
you of an update in the middle of a talk, you 
wish it had a little more human 
understanding. One example of this is 
recent work at Georgia Tech teaching 
human values to artificial agents by reading 
them stories! (Flood, 2016) 
To some extent (i) is simply the long-standing area 
of nature-inspired or biologically-inspired 
computing. However, the combination of 
computational power and psychological 
understanding mean that perhaps we are the point 
where new strides can be made. Certainly, the 
success of ‘deep learning’ and the recent computer 
mastery of Go suggest this. In addition, by my own 
calculations, for several years the internet as a 
whole has had more computational power than a 
single human brain, and we are very near the point 
when we could simulate a human brain in real time 
(Dix, 2005). 
Both goals, but particularly (ii), suggest a further 
goal: 
(iii) new interaction paradigms — We will need 
to develop new ways to design for 
interacting with human-like agents and 
robots, not least how to avoid the ‘uncanny 
valley’ and how to avoid the appearance of 
over-competence that has bedevilled much 
work in this broad area. (see more later) 
Both goals also offer the potential for a fourth 
secondary goal: 
(iv) learning about human cognition — In 
creating practical computational algorithms 
based in human qualities, we may come to 
better understand human behaviour, 
psychology and maybe even society. For 
example, in my own work on modelling 
regret (see later), it was aspects of the 
computational model that highlighted the 
important role of ‘positive regret’ (“the grass 
is greener on the other side”) to help us 
avoid ‘local minima’, where we stick to the 
things we know and do not explore new 
options. 
Human or superhuman? 
Of course humans are not perfect, do we want to 
emulate limitations and failings? 
For understanding humans (iv), the answer is 
probably “yes”, and maybe by understanding 
human fallibility we may be in a better position to 
predict and prevent failures. 
Similarly, for interacting with people (ii), the agents 
should show at least some level of human 
limitations (even if ‘put on’); for example, a chess 
program that always wins would not be much fun! 
However, for simply improving algorithms, goal (i), 
we may want to get the ‘best bits’, from human 
cognition and merge with the best aspects of 
artificial computation. Of course it maybe that the 
frailties are also the strengths, for example, the 
need to come to decisions and act in relatively 
short timescales (in terms of brain ‘ticks’) may be 
one way in which we avoid ‘over learning’, a 
common problem in machine learning. 
In addition, the human mind has developed to work 
with the nature of neural material as a substrate, 
and the physical world, both of which have shaped 
the nature of human cognition. 
Very simple animals learn purely by Skinner-like 
response training, effectively what AI would term 
sub-symbolic. However, this level of learning 
requires many exposures to similar stimuli. For 
more rare occurrences, which do not occur 
frequently within a lifetime, learning must be at the, 
very slow pace of genetic development of instincts. 
In contrast, conscious reasoning (symbolic 
processing) allows us to learn through a single or 
very small number of exposures; ideal for 
infrequent events or novel environments. 
Big Data means that computers effectively have 
access to vast amounts of ‘experience’, and 
researchers at Google have remarked on the 
‘Unreasonable Effectiveness of Data’ (Halevy, et 
al., 2009) that allows problems, such as translation, 
to be tackled in a statistical or sub-symbolic way 
which previously would have been regarded as 
essentially symbolic. 
Google are now starting to recombine statistical 
techniques with more knowledge-rich techniques in 
order to achieve better results again. As humans 
we continually employ both types of thinking, so 
there are clear human-like lessons to be learnt, but 
the eventual system will not have the same 
‘balance’ as a human. 
If humans had developed with access to vast 
amounts of data and maybe other people’s 
experience directly (rather than through culture, 
books, etc.), would we have developed differently? 
Maybe we would do more things unconsciously that 
we do consciously. Maybe with enough experience 
we would never need to be conscious at all! 
More practically, we need to decide how to make 
use of this additional data. For example, learning 
analytics is becoming an important part of 
educational practice (Bienkowski, et al., 2012; 
Buckingham Shum, 2012)  If we have an 
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automated tutor working with a child, how should 
we make use of the vast body of data about other 
tutors interactions with other children?   Should we 
have a very human-like tutor that effectively ‘reads’ 
learning analytics just as a human tutor would look 
at a learning ‘dashboard’? Alternatively, we might 
have a more loosely human-inspired ‘hive-mind’ 
tutor that ‘instinctively’ makes pedagogic choices 
based on the overall experience of all tutors, but 
maybe in an unexplainable way? 
What could go wrong … 
There have been a number of high-profile 
statements in the last year about the potential 
coming ‘singularity’ (when computers are clever 
enough to design new computers leading to 
exponential development), and warnings that 
computers could become sentient, Terminator-
style, and take over (Hawking et al., 2014). 
There was general agreement at the workshop this 
kind of risk was overblown and that despite 
breakthroughs, such as the mastery of Go, these 
are still very domain limited. It is many years before 
we have to worry about even general intelligence in 
robots, let alone sentience. 
A far more pressing problem is that of incapable 
computers, which make silly mistakes, and the way 
in which people, maybe because of the media 
attention to the success stories, assume that 
computers are more capable than they are! 
Indeed, over confidence in algorithms is not just a 
problem for the general public, but also among 
computing academics, as I found in my personal 
experience on the REF panel (Dix, 2015). 
There are of course many ethical and legal issues 
raised as we design computer systems that are 
more autonomous. This is already being played out 
with driverless cars, with issues of insurance and 
liability. Some legislators are suggesting allowing 
driverless cars, but only if there is a drive there to 
take control … but if the car relinquishes control, 
how do you safely manage the abrupt change? 
Furthermore, while the vision of autonomous robots 
taking over the world is still far fetched; more 
surreptitious control is already with us. Whether it is 
Uber cabs called by algorithm, or simply Google’s 
ranking of search results prompting particular 
holiday choices, we are all to varying extents doing 
“what the computer tells us”. I recall in the 'Dalek 
Invasion of Earth', the very un-human-like Daleks 
could not move easily amongst the rubble of war-
torn London. Instead they used ‘hypnotised men’ 
controlled by some form of neural headset. If the 
Daleks had landed today and simply taken over or 
digitally infected a few cloud computing services 
would we know? 
Legibility 
Sometimes it is sufficient to have a ‘black box’ that 
makes decisions and acts. So long as it works we 
are happy. However, a key issue for many ethical 
and legal issues, but also for practical interaction, is 
the ability to be able to interrogate a system, so 
seek explanations of why a decision has been 
made. 
Back in 1992 I wrote about these issues (Dix, 
1992), in the early days when neural networks and 
other forms of machine learning were being 
proposed for a variety of tasks form controlling 
nuclear fusion reactions to credit scoring. One 
particular scenario, was if an algorithm were used 
to pre-sort large numbers of job applications. How 
could you know whether the algorithms were being 
discriminatory? How could a company using such 
algorithms defend themselves if such an 
accusation were brought? 
One partial solution then, as now, was to accept 
underlying learning mechanisms may involve 
emergent behaviour form statistical, neural network 
or other forms of opaque reasoning. However, this 
opaque initial learning process should give rise to 
an intelligible representation. This is rather akin to a 
judge who might have a gut feeling that a 
defendant is guilty or innocent, but needs to 
explicate that in a reasoned legal judgement. 
This approach was exemplified by Query-by-
Browsing, a system that creates queries from 
examples (using a variant of ID3), but then 
converts this in SQL queries. This was 
subsequently implemented (Dix and Patrick, 1994).  
and is still running as a web demonstration. 
For many years I have argued that it is likely that 
our ‘logical’ reasoning arises precisely from this 
need to explain our own tacit judgement to others. 
While we simply act individually, or by observing 
the actions of others, this can be largely tacit, but 
as soon as we want others to act in planned 
collaborate ways, for example to kill a large animal, 
we need to convince them. Once we have the 
mental mechanisms to create these explanations, 
these become internalised so that we end up with 
internal means to question our own thoughts and 
judgement, and even use them constructively to 
tackle problems more abstract and complex than 
found in nature. That is dialogue leads to logic! 
SCENARIOS 
The workshop split into groups and discussed 
scenarios as a means to understand the potential 
challenges for human-like computing. Over multiple 
session the group I was in discussed one main 
scenario and then a variant. 
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Paramedic for remote medicine 
The main scenario consisted of a patient far form a 
central medical centre, with an intelligent local 
agent communicating intermittently and remotely 
with a human doctor. Surprisingly the remote 
aspect of the scenario was not initially proposed by 
me thinking of Tiree, but by another member of the 
group thinking abut some of the remote parts of the 
Scottish mainland. 
The local agent would need to be able 
communicate with the patient, be able to express a 
level of empathy, be able to physically examine 
(needing touch sensing, vision), and discuss 
symptoms. On some occasions, like a triage nurse, 
the agent might be sufficiently certain to be able to 
make a diagnosis and recommend treatment. 
However, at other times it may need to pass on to 
the remote doctor, being able to describe what had 
been done in terms of examination, symptoms 
observed, information gathered from the patient, in 
the same way that a paramedic does when handing 
over a patient to the hospital. However, even after 
the handover of responsibility, the local agent may 
still form part of the remote diagnosis, and maybe 
able to take over again once the doctor has 
determined an overall course of action. 
• The scenario embodied many aspects of 
human-like computing: 
• The agent would require a level of 
emotional understanding to interact with the 
patient 
• It would require fine and situation 
contingent robotic features to allow physical 
examination 
• Diagnosis and decisions would need to be 
guided by rich human-inspired algorithms 
based on large corpora of medical data, 
case histories and knowledge of the 
particular patient. 
• The agent would need to be able to explain 
its actions both to the patient and to the 
doctor. That is it would not only need to 
transform its own internal representations 
into forms intelligible to a human, but do so 
in multiple ways depending on the inferred 
knowledge and nature of the person. 
• Ethical and legal responsibility are key 
issues in medical practice 
• The agent would need to be able manage 
handovers of control. 
• The agent would need to understand its 
own competencies in order to know when to 
call in the remote doctor. 
The scenario could be in physical or mental health. 
The latter is particularly important given recent 
statistics, which suggested only 10% of people in 
the UK suffering mental health problems receive 
suitable help. 
Physiotherapist 
As a more specific scenario still, one fog the group 
related how he had been to an experienced 
physiotherapist after a failed diagnosis by a 
previous physician. Rather than jumping straight 
into a physical examination, or even apparently 
watching the patient’s movement, the 
physiotherapist proceeded to chat for 15 minutes 
about aspects of the patient’s life, work and 
exercise. At the end of this process, the 
physiotherapist said, “I think I know the problem”, 
and proceeded to administer a directed test, which 
correctly diagnosed the problem and led to 
successful treatment. 
Clearly the conversation had given the 
physiotherapist a lot of information about potential 
causes of injury, aided by many years observing 
similar cases. 
To do this using an artificial agent would suggest 
some level of: 
• theory/model of day-to-day life 
At first it seems that the conversational aspects of 
require complex AI with deep social understanding.  
However, the PhD work of Ramanee Peiris (1997) 
suggests that this might not be as difficult as it 
sounds. This concerned consultations on sensitive 
subjects such as sexual health. It was known that 
when people filled in (initially paper) forms prior to a 
consultation, they were more forthcoming and 
truthful than if they had to provide the information 
face-to-face. This was even if the patient knew that 
the person they were about to see would read the 
forms prior to the consultation. 
Peiris' work extended this first to electronic forms 
and then to chat-bot style discussions which were 
semi-scripted, but used simple textual matching to 
determine which topics had been covered, 
including those spontaneously introduced by the 
patient. Interestingly, the more human like the 
system became the more truthful and forthcoming 
the patients were, even though they were less so 
wit a real human. 
As well as revealing lessons for human interactions 
with human-like computers, this also showed that 
human-like computing may be possible with quite 
crude technologies. Indeed, even Eliza was treated 
(to Weizenbaum’s alarm) as if it really were a 
counsellor, even though people knew it was ‘just a 
computer’ (Weizenbaum, 1966). 
Cognition or Embodiment? 
The overall balance of the workshop tended 
towards the cognitivist, that is more Cartesian, 
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approach starting with understanding and models 
of internal cognition, and then seeing how these 
play out with external action. Indeed, the term 
‘representation’ used repeatedly as an assumed 
central aspect of any human-like computing, and 
there was even talk of resurrecting Newell’s project 
for a ‘unified theory of cognition’ (Newell, 1990). 
There did not appear to be any hard-core 
embodiment theorist at the workshops, although 
several people who had sympathies. This was 
perhaps as well as we could easily have 
degenerated into well-rehearsed arguments for and 
against embodiment/cognition centred explanations 
… not least about the critical word ‘representation’. 
However, I did wonder whether a path that 
deliberately took embodiment centrally would be 
valuable. How many human-like behaviours could 
be modelled in this way, taking external perception-
action as central and only taking on internal 
representations when they were absolutely 
necessary, what Andy Clark calls the 007 principle: 
“In general evolved creatures will neither store 
nor process information in costly ways when 
they can use the structure of the environment 
and their operations on it as a convenient stand-
in for the information-processing operations 
concerned.” (Clark, 1989, 1998). 
Such an approach has limits (e.g. Gray &Fu, 2001; 
Dix 2011), not least the physiotherapist’s 25 minute 
chat, but I would guess would be more successful 
over a wider range of behaviours and scenarios 
then we would at first think. 
HUMAN–COMPUTER INTERACTION AND 
HUMAN-LIKE COMPUTING 
There are clearly points of intersection between 
human-like computing and existing HCI research 
concerns, as well as new challenges and 
opportunities. It was also certainly clear during the 
workshop that there is a substantial role for human 
factors from fine motor interactions, to 
conversational interfaces and socio-technical 
systems design. 
There are two sides to the connection between 
human-like computing and HCI: 
• understanding and modelling for human-like 
computing — HCI studies and models 
complex, real world, human activities and 
situations. Psychological experiments and 
models tend to be very deep and detailed, 
but narrowly focused and using controlled, 
artificial tasks. In contrast HCI’s broader, 
albeit more shallow, approach and focus on 
realistic or even ‘in the wild’ tasks and 
situations may mean that we are in an ideal 
position to inform human-like computing. 
• human interfaces for human-like computing 
— As noted in goal (iii) we will need 
paradigms for humans to interact with 
human-like computers. 
As an illustration of the first of these, a poster 
presented at the workshop by Russell Beale and 
myself, used my work on making sense of the 
apparently ‘bad’ emotion of regret (Dix, 2005b). 
An initial cognitive model of regret was formulated 
involving a rich mix of imagination (in order to pull 
past events and action to mind), counter-factual 
modal reasoning (in order to work out what would 
have happened), emption (which is modified to feel 
better or worse depending on the possible 
alternative outcomes), and Skinner-like low-level 
behavioural learning (the eventual purpose of 
regret). 
This initial descriptive and qualitative cognitive 
model was then realised in a simplified 
computational model, which had a separate ‘regret’ 
module, which could be plugged into a basic 
behavioural learning system.   Both the basic 
system and the system with regret learnt, but the 
addition of regret did so with between 5 and 10 
times fewer exposures.   That is, the regret made a 
major improvement to the machine learning. 
Turning to the second. Direct manipulation has 
been at the heart of interaction design since the PC 
revolution in the 1980s. Prior to that command line 
interfaces (or worse job control interfaces), 
suggested a mediated paradigm, where operators 
‘asked’ the computer to do things for them. Direct 
manipulation changed that turning the computer 
into a passive virtual world of computational objects 
on which you operated with the aid of tools. 
To some extent we need to shift back to the 1970s 
mediated paradigm, but renewed, where the 
computer is no longer like a severe bureaucrat 
demanding the precise grammatical and procedural 
request; but instead a helpful and understanding 
aide. For this we can draw upon existing areas of 
HCI such as human-human communications, 
intelligent user interfaces, conversational agents 
and human–robot interaction. 
Smart environments where the intelligence is more 
hidden, can pose more problems when these 
technologies impinge of users experience if we are 
to avoid a 'ghosts in the wall' effect.  In work on 
low-intention/ low-attention interactions a number of 
design issues have emerged (Dix, 2002, 2017), for 
example the need to recognise that there are two 
tasks, the sensed and supported task; and the 
need for the system behaviour toy be capable of 
being made intelligible.  
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